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ABSTRACT

For almost 40 years the perception of a Soviet threat has influenced much foreign and domestic political behavior in the United States. How to respond to the threat has been a subject of intense debate, but the reality of the threat has been taken for granted. Conviction about the reality of this threat dates back to George Kennan's long telegram of 1946 in which he described what he believed to be the Soviet world view, one dominated by an unrealistic appraisal of Western intentions, governed by internal considerations, and dedicated to total destruction of rival power. This perception of the Soviet Union provided a justification, previously lacking, for an American military buildup and a new foreign policy stance toward the Soviet Union. This occurred at a time when the United States felt uncertain about its own position in the world; the atomic bomb had just been developed, and important changes were occurring in the American political and economic system. To call into question our conviction about a Soviet threat would call into question the entire military industrial system which has developed in the United States since World War II and would force us to rethink our goals once again. (IS)

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THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE SOVIET THREAT

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I. Introduction

For nearly four decades, the perception that a Soviet threat exists out there in the world has informed much of American foreign and domestic political behavior. How to respond to the threat has been a subject of intense debate. The reality of the threat has been taken for granted. This paper questions the reality.[1]

The argument does not depend primarily on a reexamination of Soviet behavior in the post-World War II era. What the Soviet Union was doing, intended to do or had the capability of doing if it wanted are issues that are largely irrelevant to the question at hand. They are of marginal relevance to us because they appear historically to have been of marginal relevance.

In its origin and subsequent history, the perception of a Soviet threat has never depended primarily on careful, systematic, rational, scholarly analysis of Soviet behavior. In this and similar areas of human behavior, analysis of this kind necessarily produces results attended by a high degree of ambiguity and uncertainty, and thus also by substantial debate over fundamental assumptions and methods. What characterizes the perception of a Soviet threat in the United States, however, is

not ambiguity and uncertainty but conviction and the absence of debate. It is the transformation of ambiguity into conviction that requires explanation, and it is precisely at this point of transformation that Soviet behavior was irrelevant.

To arrive at conviction, what is relevant is the adoption of a single schema with which to interpret data and eliminate ambiguity. When more than one interpretive schema is in use, the nature of reality will be contested. When only one is in use, the nature of reality will be taken for granted, uninhibited action will follow, and the multiple consequences of this action will make it increasingly difficult to develop and employ alternative schemas. This has been the history of the reality of the Soviet threat, and it can be told primarily in terms of events taking place in the United States between a script and its readers.[2]

The script -- that is, the schema for defining the character of Soviet behavior and guiding American response to it -- was initially provided by George Kennan in his Long Telegram from Moscow in February 1946. Its initial readers were various groups of appointed and elected officials in Washington, who were able to use the script as a political resource with which to defeat, and eventually to eliminate from the political process, any alternative interpretation of Soviet behavior.

The conviction of a Soviet threat emerged at this point and in such a way as to create the conditions for its continual reproduction. Nothing the Soviet Union did, or might reasonably have done, was now capable of dislodging the conviction of a threat. Moroever, given the nature of the script, every move the United States now made to combat the perceived threat actually worked to enhance the perception of it.

The purpose of this paper is to show how this self-generating, self-confirming reality was constructed and subsequently maintained. It is necessary to begin by recalling important dimensions of the American political scene in 1945.

II. Dilemmas of Power in the Republic

The United States in 1945 was an 18th Century republic experiencing a 20th Century identity crisis. The crisis, which had been brewing for several decades, concerned the nature and uses of the powers of the federal government at home and abroad. Despite efforts to do so, the Roosevelt Administration's 12 years of rule did not succeed in creating a new identity for the government at home or for America's role in the world. Indeed, the New Deal reforms and Roosevelt's wartime agreements with allies served to accentuate, rather than resolve, the inherited dilemmas of power.

It was the advent of nuclear weapons at the end of World War II that brought these dilemmas to a head, and it was Kennan's definition of the Soviet threat and the uses made of his telegram that finally shaped a new character for the American state. The republican legacy, the Roosevelt legacy, and the arrival of the atomic bomb are thus the three dimensions of the American political scene in 1945 which must now be reviewed.

The Republican Legacy

For a 20th Century nation-state, the United States was unusual in the degree of its antipathy to concentrations of power in any form, public or private. Of course, hostility to concentrated power, and to the forms of dependency which such power produces, had been a prominent characteristic of republican theory from its earliest beginnings. A citizen, according to Aristotle, was one who actively participated in a process of ruling and being ruled. Any form of dependency on the power of others necessarily incapacited one for citizenship, and the spread of dependency throughout the polity was virtually synonymous with a process of corruption leading to tyranny. The pronounced tone of historical pessimism in republican thought was due to the recognition that this process of corruption could never be prevented for long.[3]

In the United States, however, special circumstances of geography and history had encouraged the belief that the dangers of dependency and concentrated power might be avoided well into the future.[4] After all, we were a people who had never known concentrated power in any native form, feudal or monarchical. We were a society of separate states long before there was a central government, and this government owed its origin to a successful rebellion against a foreign rather than an indigenous power. We were committed in our constitution to keep power checked and widely dispersed. We were blessed with an almost endless frontier in which to nourish the virtues of independence and to secure its material foundation. We successfully fought a series of wars, including a civil war, to keep this frontier open for settlement by free and independent citizens, and never in all these victories had we resorted to a large and potentially corrupting professional army. We had relied instead upon the virtuous spirit of citizen-soldiers. This was the kind of cultural momentum that allowed us to carry the ideological predilections and political habits of the 18th Century into the 20th.

At this point, however, our republican inheritance began to lose its magic. One incorrigible problem was the growth of the large corporation.[5] National in its scope, seemingly unresponsive to local concerns and indifferent to any welfare but its own, here in our midst was an undeniable force making for

corruption and subjection. Against its malevolent powers no republican antidote seemed to work. Efforts to break it up by anti-trust measures were usually too late and too feeble. Efforts to tame it by mild federal regulation were easy for it to circumvent. Yet the stronger measures some were proposing threatened to substitute a public for a private tyranny. This was the first great dilemma of republican power in the 20th Century: it seemed impossible not to use, and equally impossible to use, the power of the federal government against the ever-increasing power of the private corporation without destroying our republican character.

This dilemma was compounded by a second. The world was getting smaller. The oceans no longer guaranteed American security, and given Europe's colonial appetite, the foreign markets thought necessary to our prosperity were no longer assured either. Gradually, we were becoming involved in the kinds of commercial, diplomatic and military rivalry which we formerly had regarded with high-minded indifference.[6] By the time Wilson finally dragged the country into a European war that most Americans didn't understand and mistakenly believed he was trying to avoid, most of the elements of a republican dilemma were apparent.[7]

To engage in the scramble for colonies was beneath us -- and also beyond us since the good spots were taken -- but to try to make the countries of the world over into peace-loving

democracies was a madman's delusion. If we didn't play the game of global power politics, then soon we would become an isolated and impoverished fortress, forced to adopt rigid, centralized controls over our political and economic life. If we did play the game, however, we would need the proper institutional tools, and these were not likely to fit the republican mold. An enlarged professional military establishment, development of air power, devaluation of the role of citizen-soldier, an increase in the powers of the executive, and more of that cozy collaboration between government and big business that had proved so indispensable in World War I: all these seemed essential to the exercise of world power in an age of modern warfare. From the perspective of our republican past, there appeared to be no winning choice. The dilemma, in short, was that we knew neither how to be a world power nor how not to be one while still remaining, in either case, our kind of republic.

The Roosevelt Legacy

In its twelve years of rule, the Roosevelt Administration attempted to resolve these dilemmas within a republican framework, and the attempt failed. The initial and major effort, of course, was to use the powers of the federal government to bring the large corporation under some degree of democratic control and, at the same time, to redistribute material and

political resources to groups which had not shared notably in either. For many people in the Roosevelt camp, economic depression was a punishment for the republican sin of allowing too much arbitrary power to the corporations.[8] Consumers, industrial workers and small farmers had all been disenfranchised by the power of big business. Consequently, the capacity to produce had outgrown the capacity to consume, and market forces could no longer be expected to correct this imbalance. Government action was therefore required to foster democratic economic planning, to encourage union organization and collective bargaining, to redistribute income through income tax, social security and minimum wage legislation, and to provide jobs through public works.[9] Otherwise, the imbalance of power which had already produced an economic disaster for the Republic might soon produce a political disaster as well.

The claim that these efforts failed has a quite specific meaning in the present context. The terms of judgment which have often engaged historians -- whether the New Deal saved capitalism, or initiated the welfare state, or shaped the course of liberalism for the coming decades -- were not the terms of judgment which engaged contemporaries. What concerned them was whether the New Deal was an effective or legitimate instrument of republican renewal, and it was in this sense, for proponents and opponents alike, that the New Deal failed.

In the eyes of opponents, Roosevelt rapidly assumed the shape of a would-be tyrant who was leading the country into socialism. When southern whites saw unions advocating equal pay for blacks and whites, they called it communistic. When business interests saw that they could not control economic planning, they called it socialistic. When rural areas, small towns and small businesses throughout the country saw their tax money diverted to the urban poor, they called it socialistic and communistic. By the time Roosevelt proposed his plan to enlarge the Supreme Court, even many New Deal allies began to fear a dictatorship. Each group threatened by the new uses of government had a different set of complaints, but all could agree on one thing: Roosevelt and his "pinko" supporters were destroying the Republic.[10]

In the eyes of many New Dealers, however, their efforts had not come even close to restoring a republican balance of power. Their key program, democratic economic planning, had been obstructed from the start by business interests and then destroyed by a reactionary Supreme Court. Indeed, corporate control over the economy was actually increasing as a result of mergers and acquisitions. Collective bargaining, on the other hand, was tied up in the courts and then interrupted by the war before the scope of labor's rights could be established. If it turned out that bargaining was limited to wage issues and working conditions, then corporations would be free to raise prices and further undermine purchasing power. In this view, the country

was as vulnerable as ever to the abuse of power by the corporations and their "proto-fascist" allies.[11]

Clearly, the New Deal's attempt to resolve a republican dilemma had actually polarized the political language and practice of republicanism, and this polarization soon spilled over into widely divergent conceptions of America's role as a world power. To New Dealers like Secretary of Agriculture and then Vice President Henry Wallace, the Republic could not be saved from the abuse of power at home unless there was also a New Deal around the globe for the common man.[12] The problem, as Wallace outlined it in his wartime pamphlet, "The Price of Free World Victory", was the imbalance of power on a global scale caused by the exploitative practices of European imperialism and its corporate allies. International cartels, monopolies and protective tariffs were keeping prices high and consumption low, frustrating the desire of people everywhere for a higher standard of living. The inevitable consequence was the spread of fascism and communism, and these could come to America, too, unless rising global purchasing power provided a market for our agricultural and manufacturing surpluses.

Thus, for Wallace and the New Deal multitudes he spoke for, the war against fascism had also to be a war against international corporate power:

"International cartels that serve American greed and

> the German will to power must go. Cartels in the peace to come must be subjected to international control for the common man, as well as being under adequate control by the respective home governments."

The great danger, as Wallace saw it, was that corporate influence might lead America to side with reactionary forces around the world in an effort to pick up and put together again the disintegrating colonial empires of Europe. The common people of the Third World would then be forced into a revolutionary alliance with Russia as their only hope, and America might then seek either war with Russia or find itself increasingly isolated. What had to be avoided above all was a Russian-American confrontation after World War II. Then, out of our own revolutionary past, we might be able to find sources of support for the revolutionary aspirations of common people everywhere.[13]

For anti-New Dealers, America's world role looked quite different. Until Pearl Harbor, and even after, many were reluctant to support American participation in the war on the grounds that it would only enhance Roosevelt's grab for power and lead further to a socialist dictatorship.[14] Henry Luce's famous article in Time, "The American Century", was designed to answer this fear.[15] For Luce, an active role for America in the world was indispensable if the New Deal and its uses of governmental power were to be defeated. If America won the war in a really big way, Luce argued, the devastation suffered by all the Great

Powers of Asia and Europe would allow us to inherit their markets and fields for entrepreneurial activity on a colossal scale. As he put it,

> "For example, we think of Asia as being worth only a few hundred millions a year to us. Actually, in the decades to come Asia will be worth to us exactly zero - or else it will be worth to us four, five, ten billions of dollars a year."

The century could be ours. Enormous prosperity at home would then make social reform unnecessary. It is true that we would have to take "a very tough attitude to hostile governments", but we would be so rich that "[f]or every dollar we spend on armaments, we should spend at least a dime in a gigantic effort to feed the world..."

The purpose in citing these wartime documents is not to make a case for any sort of economic explanation of postwar American foreign policy. Luce and Wallace were continuing the republican debate over the proper extent and use of governmental power, and each had come to understand, with considerable foreboding, that how America eventually defined and pursued its role in the world might very well determine the political character and even survival of the Republic at home. The two great republican dilemmas of power appeared now to be joined and fused as one interdependent dilemma, but they were no more resolved at the end of the New Deal than they had been at its beginning. The issues, the relations between them and the overall stakes were now much

clearer, but everything crucial to the outcome had yet to be decided.

In their quite different attempts to inspire participation in World War II, Wallace and Luce were revealing, in fact, how undeveloped and ill-formed America's sense of itself as a world power continued to be. The fierce debate from 1939 to 1941 over intervention was a virtual replication of the pre-WWI debate over neutrality.[16] Only Pearl Harbor resolved the issue, and even then the United States did not declare war on Germany until she declared war on us. As late as September, 1941, in defining "the major national objectives of the United States", the Board of Estimate of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was prepared to settle for the maintenance of a balance of power in Europe and Asia.[17] Reflecting in part the desire to balance Russian power and in part a recognition of our own limited capacity to project power overseas, the Joint Chiefs were accepting, in effect, Nazi control over most of Europe except the British Isles and Japanese control over large parts of Asia.[20] It is true that Roosevelt, in signing the Atlantic Charter a month earlier, had committed the nation to much more ambitious, idealistic and ambiguous goals. Since he had neither the military means nor political support to pursue these goals, however, his action tends rather to confirm than contradict the impression that America had not yet grown into the role of a Great Power, let alone a Superpower.[18]

The Arrival of the Atomic Bomb

The atomic bomb changed all the calculations.[19] Virtually overnight, America found herself in possession of a resource with which to exercise military and diplomatic power on a global scale. The bomb was much more than a wartime weapon of unprecedented destructive power. It was also a bargaining chip, a huge carrot and a huge stick, which might be dangled or brandished in front of potential allies and enemies alike. To those who might need our protection, we now had something to offer. To those who might thwart our will and vision, we now had something which might make them think twice.

The dilemma of being both a world power and a republic now seemed not so much resolved as side-stepped. The bomb looked as if it could provide just the kind of national security that the citizen-soldier had become incapable of providing under 20th Century conditions. Almost by definition, the citizen was unprepared to fight until well after a state of national emergency existed, and he was eager to return to civilian life as soon as the emergency was over. He was therefore of little use in preventing emergencies from arising or in projecting the nation's will abroad in peacetime. As Pearl Harbor was thought to show, this situation had left the country vulnerable to a devastating surprise attack. With the bomb, however, we might

always be prepared, even without a large and expensive professional standing army. We would need only a well-developed air force with military bases and transit and landing rights around the world. From this strategic frontier, we could then control both oceans, keep hostile powers far from American territory, and carry out swift and devastating attacks on their homelands if and when that necessity arose.[20]

Voiced in both civilian and military circles, and especially by the Air Force, these great expectations proved surprisingly difficult to translate into realistic plans and policies.[21] Arriving in the context of the republican and New Deal legacies, the atomic bomb actually set off a vast political "chain-reaction" with unpredictable consequences. Almost immediately, institutions and officials began a struggle to make this new resource serve their own advantage as well as their diverse conceptions of the nation's advantage. Dispute, rivalry, anxiety, ambiguity and self-doubt within the body-politic raised dozens of hard questions and provided few good or reassuring answers.[22]

After all, the bomb was developed for use against a ruthless enemy, Nazi Germany, in the course of a war which dissolved many moral compunctions. It was used finally and primarily as an alternative to the invasion of Japan and the certain death of thousands of American troops at the hands of an enemy who had

already bombed us. In peacetime, in the absence of such "deserving" enemies, was it really right and proper to build a military establishment and a foreign policy around the centerpiece of nuclear weapons? Was it even in our self-interest to do so? Soon other countries would be making these bombs. Would war then be more or less likely? Would we feel more or less secure when our atomic monopoly was over? What good would the bomb then be as a bargaining chip, and if we tried to use it in this way while we still had a monopoly, what especially would be the effect upon our already suspicious wartime ally, the Soviet Union?

All hope for a harmonious postwar world order depended on the character of Soviet-American relations, and there were many important disagreements between us to be settled.[23] Suppose we did decide to jeopardize the possibility of agreements with the Soviet Union now on the presumption that cooperation on the fundamental issues would not be possible. What kind of burdensome national security arrangements at home and commitments overseas would America then have to undertake? In the absence of a wartime emergency, we had never been willing to make such arrangements or commitments before. Why should we be willing to make them now? Already we were behaving in true republican fashion: turning our attention inward, withdrawing and demobilizing our troops, slashing military expenditures, seeking a balanced budget and refusing to pass legislation enacting

Universal Military Training.[24]

These were some of the doubts and anxieties expressed in official circles in the aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and they provide a good indication that, even with the bomb, the republican dilemma was not automatically going to disappear. The problem was mainly, but not only, the fact that the United States did not yet have an enemy worthy of the bomb: a foreign threat so obvious, compelling and anti-republican in nature that it could serve to galvanize the political will of the nation in righteous indignation. This was the way America had always mobilized her resources for war, and it would have to be way she mobilized them now in peacetime.

In addition, however, there was also the problem that the clear and present danger in the fall and winter of 1945 was obviously domestic, not international. Policy planners in the War and State Departments and a few White House aides and Cabinent members might be quarreling over the implications of the bomb and Soviet-American relations, but most of Washington was worrying about a massive wave of labor strikes and how to prevent a recurrence of depression in the absence of wartime demand.[25] Government and private forecasters, for example, were citing the need for a 30 to 50% increase in consumer purchasing power above pre-war levels. At the same time, striking autoworkers at General Motors were making the unprecedented demand for a 30

percent increase in wages with no increase in prices unless the company could prove them necessary.[26]

In response to these kinds of action, the Senate voted overwhelmingly (77 to 10) in favor of a remarkable full employment bill. The bill contained strong provisions for economic planning and automatic government spending at levels necessary to insure full employment, and it also recognized the need to control monopolistic practices and monitor the distribution of national income.[27] It seemed, for a brief moment, that the redistribution of power and privilege which had begun under Roosevelt's New Deal might still continue even though Harry Truman, and not Henry Wallace, had succeeded to the Presidency.

Already, however, the bomb's political "chain-reaction" had begun to intrude even here. A growing concern with "atomic spies" and the loyalty of government employees was adding new significance to the anti-New Dealer's old claim that there were too many communists and communist symapthizers in government.[28] Here was the first ominous sign of the powerful synergism that was to develop between those who opposed the New Deal and/or feared its extension and those who hoped to use the bomb to build up America's military establishment in a new and more extensive form. Soon, this synergism would create an anti-communist hysteria so intense that any advocacy of either peaceful

relations with the Soviet Union or an extension of New Deal reforms risked the charge of treason.[29]

III. The Cold War Script and Its Readers

Who were the Russians? What did they want and what would they settle for? Could you negotiate with them? Could you trust them? These were the questions Kennan set out to answer in his 8,000-word telegram of February 22, 1946.[30] Others in the U.S. government had been trying to answer these same questions for months, but they kept coming up with mixed, ambiguous answers.[31] The more they looked at actual Soviet behavior and tried to interpret it in light of what other countries like Great Britain and the United State were doing or had done, the harder it was to eliminate the ambiguity.[32] Kennan's strategy was to eliminate the ambiguity by saying as little as possible about any actual piece of Soviet behavior until he had firmly established the overall design behind it.

The Long Telegram

Kennan began his telegram with several basic features of "Post War Soviet Outlook, as Put Forward by Official Propaganda Machine". The first and main feature was the belief that the

"USSR still lives in antagonistic 'capitalist encirclement' with which in the long run there can be no permanent peaceful coexistence." Quoting a speech from Stalin in 1927 which referred to a "battle" between a socialist center and a capitalist center for command of the world economy, Kennan implied, and later said explicitly, that nothing had changed in the regime's outlook. The regime, according to Kennan, still believed that: the "[c]apitalist world is beset with internal conflicts", these conflicts "inevitably generate wars" and, therefore, intervention against the USSR "must... be forestalled at all costs."

Kennan's point was not simply that these beliefs were false but that they were baseless. If Soviet leaders were at all responsive to reality, they would have abandoned these beliefs long ago. This point was decisive for Kennan so it may be worthwhile to recall that at that very moment the U.S. War Department was in the process of carrying out its policy of encircling the Soviet Union with military bases.[33] The primary purpose of these bases was, at the first outbreak of hostilities, to allow planes loaded with nuclear bombs to strike swiftly and thoroughly at every major city in the Soviet Union. Moreover, the United States was also experiencing at that moment the most extensive labor-capital conflict in its history and was by no means free and clear of the worry of renewed depression.

Nevertheless, Kennan believed he had found decisive evidence of the "Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs." The view derived from "basic inner-Russian necessities" and had "indeed, little to do with conditions outside Russia." At the bottom of this neurosis was an "instinctive Russian sense of insecurity", which began long ago with exposure to the depradations of fierce nomadic peoples and was heightened when Russia came in contact more recently with "the more competent, more powerful" and "economically advanced West". Unfortunately, Russia's leaders learned from this history "to seek security only in patient and deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it."

Marxist dogma, according to Kennan, was therefore indispensable to Russia's present rulers, who would use it as a guide to all their actions at home and abroad. Marxism justified their paranoia, their self-imposed isolation, their restriction of objective information from and about the outside world, their constant build-up of the military and police power of the state, and their "fluid and constant pressure to extend [the] limits of Russian police power" beyond their borders.

In their efforts to expand their power, they would work on both an official and a subterranean plane.

> "For the moment, these efforts are restricted to certain neighboring points conceived of here as being of immediate strategic necessity, such as Northern

> Iran, Turkey and possibly Bornholm. However, other points may at any time come into question, if and as concealed Soviet political power is extended to new areas. Thus a 'friendly' Persian Government might be asked to grant Russia a port on [the] Persian Gulf. Should Spain fall under Communist control, [the] question of [a] Soviet base at Gilbraltar Strait might be activated. But such claims will appear on official level only when unofficial preparation is complete."

This view of Soviet behavior has, of course, become so ingrained through constant repetition that it may be difficult to see today how much interpretive work Kennan was actually doing. No modern Great Power has lived entirely within its own borders. Certainly, Germany, France, Britain and the United States did not do so in the 19th or 20th Centuries. There have almost always been alliances with neighboring states and sometimes with distant ones. Naval bases and warm water ports have been a necessity. Russia is probably unique in the degree to which it has <u>not</u> relied upon these arrangements. Indeed, it was just this relative isolation that Kennan used as evidence of Russian paranoia. Now, however, he had also made suspect any Russian attempt to establish alliances or bases beyond its borders. Such moves were evidence of "the natural and instinctive urges of Russian rulers" to extend the limits of their police power. Moreover, whenever they succeeded, it would constitute a sign of previous subterranean machinations, for no nation could be expected voluntarily and in its own interests to seek friendship with the Soviet Union.

Kennan was in the process of creating an interpretive straight-jacket from which Soviet leaders could not escape no matter what they did. Every aspect of their policy was subjected to the same schema. If they participated in international organizations like the UN, it was not because they saw it as "a mechanism for a permanent and stable world society," as we presumably did, but because they saw an "opportunity of extending Soviet power or of inhibiting or diluting the power of others." In international economic matters, their "underlying policy" would be autarchy. However, if they received the "large scale long term credits" they had been seeking from the West, they would probably "do lip service" to "building up international economic exchanges."

On the subterranean plane, of course, their policies would be much worse. They would infiltrate "labor unions, youth leagues, women's organizations, racial societies, religious societies, social organizations, cultural groups, liberal magazines, publishing houses, etc." They would set poor "against rich, black against white, young against old." They would attempt to "disrupt national self-confidence" and "hamstring measures of national defense." As for the "colonial backward, or dependent peoples", "particularly violent efforts will be made to weaken the power and influence of Western Powers...On this level, no holds will be barred."

What, then, should the United States do to defend itself? Kennan wrote of this as "the greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced," but he did not have in mind the traditional meaning of diplomacy. We were, after all, dealing with a regime "seemingly inaccessible to considerations of reality in its basic reactions." It was, moreover, "fanatically committed to the belief that with [the] U.S. there can be no permanent modus vivendi,...that our traditional way of life [must] be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken." Clearly, this was not the kind of political force one talked to reasonably, in a spirit of negotiation and compromise. "Impervious to [the] logic of reason, it is highly sensitive to [the] logic of force."

The great diplomatic difficulty to which Kennan referred was thus the challenge of being able to use force so skillfully, even up to the brink of war if necessary, that one ultimately got one's way without actually have to go to war.

> "Soviet power...does not take unnecessary risks...Thus, if [the] adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so. If situations are properly handled there need be no prestige-engaging showdowns."

Kennan admitted that this was not a "pleasant" picture, but he took encouragement from several things. First, the Soviets were "still by far the weaker force." Transfers of power were particularly difficult for them, and the problems of governing

their recent territorial acquisitions would impose "additional strains." He thus implied that by skillful use of force the United States might be able to help transform the charcter of the regime. Second, he thought the American public would respond to the challenge if it were adequately educated to the "realities" of the Russian situation. He warned, however, that the "[p]ress cannot do this alone. It must be done mainly by [the] Government, which is necessarily more experienced and better informed..." Finally, he couldn't see

> "what we would be risking. Our stake in this country...is remarkably small. We have here no investments to guard, no actual trade to lose, virtually no citizens to protect, few cultural contacts to preserve."

Kennan did have one fear, however, with which he closed his telegram. "After all, the greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet communism," he wrote, "is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping."

The Readers

For centuries, the West read the world through Holy Scripture. Together with the commentaries of the Church Fathers, the Bible taught the peoples of Christendom how to interpret what was going on "out there", and it guided their responses. Above all, it

provided the conviction of Providence. Whatever happened, He had a hand in it. Kennan's Long Telegram has been called "the bible" of American foreign policy-makers. It was. Above all, it provided the conviction that there was an All-Powerful Enemy out there. Whatever happened, the Enemy had a hand in it.

The conviction that one is dealing with a genuine enemy can be as up-lifting to the soul as the presence of a genuine friend, especially when the soul in question is suffering from a republican conscience. Kennan had been saying the same sorts of things for a long time, during and before the war, but no one paid much attention.[34] Roosevelt had not been interested, the United States did not yet have the atomic bomb, and no Soviet troops were stationed in Eastern Europe. Most American officials at that time were still reading the world through a republican script, hoping the republican hope for a harmonious postwar world order, the only kind of world we felt comfortable in, the only kind we didn't have to pay much attention to. Now, however, Kennan's message was greeted with an enthusiasm suggesting relief.

Secretary of State Byrnes called it a "splendid analysis." The Director of the Office of European Affairs, H. Freeman Matthews, told Kennan it was "magnificent," adding, "I cannot overestimate its importance to those of us here struggling with the problem." The naval attache in Moscow recommended it to his superiors

because the "problem transcends diplomacy." Copies were rushed to U.S. diplomatic missions around the world, to General Eisenhower, Secretary of War Robert Patterson, and top War Department Planners. Navy Secretary James Forrestal had hundreds of copies made and evidently sent them "all over town." Leaked to a number of journalists in an effort to shape public opinion as Kennan had urged, the telegram became the source for an article in Time, which was accompanied by a map labelled "Communist Contagion" showing Iran, Turkey and Manchuria as "infected" and Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Afghanistan, and India as "exposed."[35]

On the whole, however, efforts to alert American public opinion to "the Soviet threat" developed slowly, ran into resistance, and did not have a discernible effect for some time.[36] Rather, it was on readers within the foreign policy-making apparatus that the Long Telegram worked its most immediate and significant effects. The difference in the concerns of American foreign policy-makers before and after the arrival of Kennan's telegram is dramatic.

Before the telegram, three major concerns had inhibited policy-making and prevented it from taking a clear direction with respect to the Soviet Union.[37] First, there was a concern not to antagonize the Soviet Union unnecessarily and thereby jeopardize the possibility for postwar agreements. Numerous

expressions of this concern appear in the records of senior military planners, who apparently thought at this time that Soviet leaders were capable of responding positively to signs of American restraint. Sometimes, to be sure, this concern was overriden by other considerations.[38] On other occasions, however, the concern proved decisive. Out of sensitivity to Russian fears, the Joint PostWar Committee recommended not using U.S. installations in Alaska for staging expeditionary forces, and this recommendation was accepted. So was the recommendation of Generals Eisenhower, Lincoln and other officers against creating a central economic authority for Western Europe because it might appear to be an anti-Soviet bloc.[39]

Second, there was a concern to analyze the character of Soviet postwar intentions. Significantly, efforts in this direction were unable to produce clear evidence of aggressive intent towards either the continental United States or any other area considered to be of major importance to us, such as Eurasia. Civilian officials and military strategists were in nearly universal agreement that the Soviets desired to avoid military engagement and were not making any preparations for war.[40] Indeed, as late as September 1947, the CIA concluded that the Soviets would not seek to conquer Western Europe because they recognized their inability to control hostile populations and would fear triggering a war with the United States that could not be won.[41] Throughout 1945, there was certainly a high degree of

apprehension over Soviet long-term intentions and an almost constant state of moral apoplexy over Soviet actions in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Near East, and Manchuria. No one thought these actions were nice or that it would be easy, in the words of Charles Bohlen, Kennan's colleague at the American Embassy in Moscow, to integrate "the policies of a dictatorship, directed virtually exclusively towards the furtherance of the national interest of the Soviet state, with the principles of world cooperation and international morality..."[42]

Before Kennan's telegram, however, intelligence analysts and strategic planners were inclined to see even the most troubling of these Soviet actions as efforts to establish an effective security system.[43] Many assessments noted that, despite their large gains during the war, the Soviets had still not achieved a safe security zone, especially on their southern periphery. In this light, in fact, it was still possible for a Foreign Service officer to acknowledge that the Soviet quest for bases in the Dardenelles did not differ in substance from the American quest for bases in the Atlantic and Pacific.[44] According to one historian's recent and apparently exhaustive survey of the relevant documents,

> "...the still prevailing outlook at the end of 1945 was to dismiss the role of ideology in Soviet foreign policy yet emphasize Soviet distrust of foreigners; to stress Soviet expansionism but acknowledge the possibility of accommodation; to abhor Soviet domination of Eastern Europe but discuss Soviet policies elsewhere in terms of power and influence; and

to dwell upon the Soviet preoccupation with security yet acknowledge doubts about ultimate Soviet intentions."[45]

Third, and finally, there was a concern with assessing Soviet military capabilities, and these assessments left American officials feeling extremely confident. The Soviets had no long-range strategic air force, no atomic bomb, and meager air defenses. The Soviet navy was considered ineffective except for its submarine forces. War Department analysts estimated that the Soviet Union would require approximately fifteen years to overcome wartime losses in manpower and industry, ten years to redress the shortage of technicians, five to ten years to develop a strategic air force, fifteen to twenty-five years to construct a modern navy, ten years to refurbish military transport, ten years (or less) to quell resistance in occupied areas, fifteen to twenty years to establish a military infrastructure in the Far East, three to ten years to acquire the atomic bomb, and an unspecified number of years to overcome the vulnerability of the Soviet rail network and petroleum industry to long-range bombing. Analysts were aware of Soviet superiority in manpower, but they doubted her ability to mount and sustain a surprise attack or to overcome acute logistical problems in any attempt to overrun Eurasia.[46]

Given these three considerations -- the concern with the effects of our behavior on Soviet behavior, the uncertainty as to

Soviet intentions towards us and the areas of greatest interest to us, and the certainty as to Soviet military weakness -- it was obviously difficult for policy-makers to make clear-cut recommendations. No matter what their hopes, fears or institutional interests may have been, they were certainly not in a strong position to approach the President, Congress or the American public with alarm-ringing recommendations. Neither diplomatic belligerance nor a conventional or nuclear military build-up could easily be justified in terms that Americans might find persuasive.

The Long Telegram made these three inhibiting considerations seem irrelevant, and that is why it was greeted with such enthusiasm. If Soviet leaders were "seemingly inaccessible to considerations of reality," and if their "neurotic" world view derived from "basic inner-Russian necessities", what point was there in worrying about the effects of our behavior on Soviet behavior? Nothing we did to accommodate them would ever make them more agreeable and might actually encourage their appetite. Moreover, if their deepest instincts impelled them to seek "the total destruction of rival power", and if they were "committed fanatically to the belief that with [the] U.S. there can be no permanent modus vivendi", what was the point of fussing over Soviet intentions in any particular instance? It was the overall design that mattered, and if the United States waited to respond only to outright agression, we might find ourselves in so weak a

position that it would be too late to do anything. Finally, if the Soviet Union relied upon subterranean preparations, and if it was able to expand its influence by exploiting other countries' internal weaknesses, what was the point of feeling reassured by the Soviet's present, limited military capabilities? Clearly, these capabilities were only one aspect of Soviet strategy and probably not the most important aspect for some time. From this perspective, a seemingly indefinite and potential threat could suddenly assume terrifying proportions.

In the weeks immediately following the reception and circulation of the Long Telegram, a remarkable shift of perception in policy-making circles occurred along just these lines.[47] One hears the resonances of Kennan's telegram again and again in the documents of this period. For example, by the end of March, General John E. Hull, director of the Operations Division, was telling his theatre commanders that the Soviets were "constitutionally incapable of being conciliated." By April, an important subcommittee of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee had decided that Soviet suspicions were "not susceptible of removal". By July, in a summary report to the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff was declaring the Soviet objective to be "world domination".[48]

It was as if policy-makers had emerged from darkness and confusion into the light. They were no longer interested in

exploring ways of accommodating the Soviet Union's legitimate strategic requirements or considering how American initiatives might influence Soviet policy.[49] According to Leffler, both the quantity and quality of the Joint Chiefs' studies on Soviet intentions "seem to have declined during 1946." More time was spent on estimating Soviet capabilities, and some of the most thoughtful earlier studies on intentions were withdrawn from consideration. Information from previous studies that indicated Soviet weaknesses was now deleted, as in the JCS's July report to the President. During this period from April to July, high-ranking military officers began to pressure Secretary of State Byrnes to avoid diplomatic concessions, and it was also at this time that defense officials influenced the drafting of the Baruch Plan on international control of atomic weapons.[50]

The Long Telegram focused the minds, stiffened the resolve, and released the imagination of American foreign-policy makers. Perhaps the best way to appreciate the full significance of its effects is to look at the document that actually summarized the way dozens of officials translated Kennan's message into policy proposals in the spring and summer of 1946. That document is the memo which Clark Clifford, a White house special counsel, and George Elsey, another White House aide, wrote for Truman over the summer and presented in September.[51] Responding to the President's request for a report on the state of Soviet-American relations, they began in June to send out formal questionnaires

to the relevant top-ranking civilian and military personnel. What Clifford and Elsey got back was Kennan-plus.

In his covering letter to the President, Clifford noted the "remarkable agreement among the officials with whom I have talked and whose reports I have studied".[52] The following observations from the concluding section of the memo represent some of the areas of agreement Clifford found:

> "[Soviet leaders] believe that a war with the United States and the other leading capitalistic nations is inevitable. They are increasing their military power and the sphere of Soviet influence in preparation...and they are trying to weaken and subvert their potential opponents by every means at their disposal....
>
> "The language of military power is the only language which disciples of power politics understand...Compromise and concessions are considered, by the Soviets, to be evidences of weakness and they are encouraged by our 'retreats' to make new and greater demands.
>
> "The main deterrent to Soviet attack on the United States, or to attack on areas of the world which are vital to our security, will be the military power of this country...The Soviet Union's vulnerability is limited due to the vast area over which its key industries and natural resources are widely dispersed, but it is vulnerable to atomic weapons, biological warfare, and long-range air power. Therefore...the United States must be prepared to wage atomic and biological warfare. A highly mechanized army, which can be moved either by sea or by air, capable of seizing and holding strategic areas, must be supported by powerful naval and air forces...
>
> "The United States....should entertain no proposal for disarmament or limitation of armament as long as the possibility of Soviet aggression exists...proposals on outlawing atomic warfare and long-range offensive

weapons would greatly limit United States strength, while only moderately affecting the Soviet union...

"...The United States should support and assist all democratic countries which are in any way menaced or endangered by the U.S.S.R.. Providing military support in case of attack is a last resort: a more effective barrier to communism is strong economic support...Our efforts to...bring about economic unification of countries now divided by occupation armies are also directed toward the re-establishment of vigorous and healthy non-communist economies...

"Within the United States, communist penetration should be exposed and eliminated whenever the national security is endangered. The armed forces, government agencies and heavy industries are the principal targets for communistic infiltration at present....

"There must be such effective coordination within the government that our military and civil policies concerning the U.S.S.R., her satellites, and our Allies are consistent and forceful. Any uncertainty or discrepancy will be seized immediately by the Soviets and exploited at our cost...

"The American people should be fully informed about the difficulties in getting along with the Soviet Union, and the record of Soviet evasion, misrepresentation, aggression and militarism should be made public...."

Clearly, American policy-makers had defined, at last, an active and challenging role for themselves and their country in world affairs, even though they had to eliminate much of the distinction between peacetime and wartime in order to do it. It is important to remember, however, that the progress made between February, when they were confused and divided, and September, when they were convinced and united, was not the result of the

Soviets doing anything different. Indeed, there were, and would continue to be, numerous signs of Soviet weakness, moderation and circumspection. In the period from April to July, for example:

*Intelligence analysts reported Soviet troop withdrawals from several occupied areas;

* Ambassador Smith from Moscow called attention to an absence of hostility in the Soviet press, a moderate speech by Stalin at the UN, continuing demobilization, efforts at mediation in China and Iran, and the settlement of border problems with Afghanistan.

* General Lincoln acknowledged that, at the foreign ministers meeting in Paris, the Soviets had been willing to make numerous concessions concerning Tripolitania, the Dodecanese, and Italian reparations.

* Generals Clay and Echols and Secretary of War Patterson noted once again that it was the French and not the Russians who were obstructing agreement on united control of Germany.[53]

During this same period, the Soviets ceased pressing for territorial adjustments with Turkey, and after late summer they did not again ask for a revision of the Montreaux Convention or the acquisition of bases in the Dardenelles. This behavior continued throughout the winter and into 1947 when our intelligence analysts noted more than a half-dozen instances of Soviet moderation or concessions.[54]

At the very time the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan were being framed and approved, the Military Intelligence Division was observing that the Soviets had limited their involvement in the

Middle East, diminished their ideological rhetoric, and given only moderate support to Chinese communists.[55] The occasion for the Truman Doctrine, of course, was not any instance of Soviet behavior but a note from the British indicating that they were terminating their aid program to Greece. The Greek communists never received assistance or moral support from Stalin, who abided by his 1944 agreement with Churchill.[56] In fact, both the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were pre-programmed in the Long Telegram and Clifford Memo, regardless of what the Soviets did.

What had changed, in other words, was not Soviet behavior but rather our method of interpreting it. We now knew how to discount signs of weakness, moderation and conciliation. As Ambassador Smith cautioned in one of his cables, Washington should not be taken in by the apparent move toward "correct relationships." The Russians had the same "predatory aims", they were simply following different tactics.[57] With this scriptural mindset, American officials could feel fully justified in pursuing their own ambitious agenda.

III. Cold War Performances

After the summer of 1946, American foreign-policy makers still had much to do to accomplish their agenda, but this was not

really difficult work. It required following the script and, in a sense, letting the script define the performances it called for. The denouement was never really in doubt.

The first great task, of course, was to eliminate from the political process alternative interpretations of Soviet behavior. Policy-makers knew this was important because they knew how hard it had been for them to arrive at the "correct" interpretation. For the script to perform its work, it was essential not to get bogged down in endless debate over the reality of the Soviet threat.

Debate was not difficult to avoid, however, since the script had its own built-in devices for handling dissenters. As the Clifford memo had noted, the armed forces, government agencies, and heavy industries were "the principal targets for communistic infiltration at present". Moreover, as the memo had also noted, signs of discrepancy or uncertainty within the government would be exploited by the Soviet Union.

Seen in this light, officials who questioned the reality of the Soviet threat were in one of two dangers. They might be thought communist agents or sympathizers, or they might be accused of indirectly aiding the Soviet Union by merely stating their qualms, doubts and disagreements. It was primarily on the second of these grounds that Truman fired Henry Wallace, then Secretary

of Commerce, in September. Wallace's Madison Square Garden speech on the possibility of peaceful relations with the Soviet Union was seen to be in unforgiveable conflict with a hardline speech given in Germany by Secretary of State Byrnes. The message was clear: only those who had already reached consensus on the character of the Soviet threat, and thus on the need for maintaining consensus, would be free to speak in an official capacity on questions of peace and war.[58]

From this point on, the outcome of the battle for control of American public opinion and the political process was never in doubt. Since almost all the significant and reliable information on Soviet weakness, moderation and good faith was contained in classified government reports and cables, the public, including most of Congress, could find out about these matters only if officials wanted to tell them. This, of course, is precisely what officials didn't want to do and what the script told them not to do. They weren't lying or concealing information so much as protecting the citizen from the pit of ambiguity out of which they had just climbed.[59]

Victory was also easy because foreign policy-makers had many willing allies in and outside government. It is unnecessary to look for particular culprits, conspiracies or special interests behind the anti-communist witchhunt that occurred in Washington, and then throughout the country, for nearly the next decade.

There were, of course, dozens of special interests, from the Chamber of Commerce, which had begun a $6 million anti-communist advertising campaign, to Southern racists who wanted to defeat unionism in their region, to the Republicans who had just captured control of the House and Senate and saw an opportunity to clean New Dealers out of the Executive branch. Sometimes the anti-communism was fairly subtle, as when Charles Wilson, the President of General Motors, told the Senate Labor Committee that only by confining collective bargaining to "its proper sphere", that is, wages and working conditions and not prices or profits, could "what we have come to know as our American system" be saved from a social revolution "imported from east of the Rhine..." [60]

It was a good bet, in other words, that any group or institution which felt threatened by the New Deal or its continuation would lend tacit or explicit support to the witchhunt. It was also a good bet that some ambitious politicians would exploit this situation. Moreover, there <u>were</u> communists and communist-sympathizers in just those places the script said they were. In the thirties, they had become a prominent feature of the New Deal scene, promoting industrial unions, racial equality, women's rights, and protection for the poor. In the atmosphere of the New Deal, their views were not incompatible with their being good Americans in the republican tradition of Jefferson and Paine.

On its own, however, the domestic political situation had not produced an effective witchhunt and was probably incapable of producing one. The missing ingredient was the conviction of a foreign, Soviet threat. No set of special interests or conniving politicians, and no conspiracy of the two together, could have produced this conviction. Only the foreign policy-making establishment could have done that, and once they did, for a variety of reasons of their own -- including, no doubt, a distaste on the part of many for any further extension of the New Deal -- the spark was lit for the ensuing conflagration. Nothing and no one could stop it.[61]

Wallace's fearful prediction turned out to be correct.[62] The conviction of a Soviet threat was eliminating from Washington not only communists but also that crucial strand of the republican tradition which had been concerned as much with private as with public abuses of power. From this strand had come not only the Populist, Progressive and New Deal attacks on corporate power, but also Wallace's own special global vision for the future: a world in which communists and republicans might be allies of sorts, correcting each other's deficiencies in a common struggle against the forces of reaction.

This vision now had no chance of being realized. In the soon to be dominant rhetoric of American politics, the business of

America would be business, and republican freedom would become almost synonymous with "free enterprise". Whereas the "active principle" of a republican commonwealth in the Jeffersonian tradition had been the perpetual struggle against oligarchy and privilege, against private monopoly and arbitrary power, now the "active principle" would be a perpetual celebration and defense of the free society we had supposedly perfected. As the authors of NSC-68 put it in 1950:

> "Our free society, confronted by a threat to its basic values, naturally will take such action, including the use of military force, as may be required to protect those values. The integrity of our system will not be jeopardized by any measures, covert or overt, violent or non-violent, which serve the purposes of frustrating the Kremlin design..."[63]

The linguistic resources for contesting the uses of power in America had obviously been greatly diminished. If this was also the moment in which the large corporation finally obtained a relatively secure place for itself in the polity, it should be noted that it did not do so on its own efforts or merits, but rather as a consequence of a global anti-communist strategy which evolved by others and backed up by nuclear weapons.

The second great task called for by the script was an enormous increase in the resources devoted to military power and overseas commitments. Those who have written about this achievement have tended to cast the main actors at the time in impressive roles, whether of hero or villain. In the heroic role, there is Dean

Acheson and his aide, Paul Nitze, struggling nobly against the fiscal conservatism of capitalism and the isolationist myopia of Congress and the public. As villains, there are these same figures deliberately exaggerating the Soviet menace in order to accomplish some ulterior design, such as rescuing capitalism from a trade deficit or a recession, or defeating authentic socialist or communist movements in Western Europe.

What may be overlooked in these accounts is the degree to which all the pertinent events -- the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the decisions to increase the atomic stockpile, to rely heavily in our strategic plans upon nuclear weapons, to produce the H-Bomb and eventually to triple the size of the military budget -- were script-driven. In an important sense, the individuals who made these decisions were not autonomous actors exercising independent judgment but were instead capitulating to the dictates of a script. Without the capacity to refute the existence of a Soviet threat, as it was depicted in the Long Telegram and the Clifford memo, one simply had very little rational ground to stand on for opposing these decisions. They were pre-programmed in the conception of the threat. Without the threat, no motive -- saving capitalism, fearing socialism, or any other -- would have won support for these moves. With the threat, no motive could have defeated them.

It is true that alarming events appeared to be occurring in the

world. The Soviets successfully tested an A-Bomb. The Chinese Communists came to power. North Korea invaded South Korea. What made these events appear so alarming, however, was the script through which they were being read and which they seemed to confirm. It is a marvellous feature of the script of the Soviet threat that the world can be counted on eventually to produce events which appear to confirm the script.

The third great task which the script called for was the continual reproduction of the Soviet threat. It is tempting to think that the Soviets eventually learned to play the "We-will-bury-you" role which the script assigned them, thereby making themselves into a real threat. This does not seem to be the case, however. If one looks at a map of the world, remembers a little history, and counts, unambiguous evidence of a Soviet threat seems as hard to find today as it was in 1945. For example:

* There are 155 countries in the world today. The Soviet Union may be said to have a significant degree of influence in 19 of them.

* Seven of these 19 countries - Bulgaria, Czechoslavakia, East Germany, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and Rumania - came within Soviet influence before or soon after WWII, and all are on or closely related to the Soviet Union's borders.

* Of the twelve other countries, ten are among the world's poorest and most desperate, such as Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Laos, Mozambique, Yemen and Vietnam.

* Since 1945, a total of 35 countries have come under some degree of Soviet influence at one time or another, but the influence once gained was subsequently lost in 17 of these countries. Indeed, in terms of population, GNP and power, the losses far outweigh the gains. The losses include China, Indonesia, Egypt, India and Iraq.

* The Soviet Union has been unable to maintain influence over any major 3rd World country. Consequently, her influence is significantly less today than it was at its height in 1958.

* All the world's major military powers and industrialized nations are allied with the United States or expect our aid and protection.[64]

It looks, in other words, as if the world in general and the Soviet Union in particular have pretty much gone their own separate ways since 1945. The argument that this would not have happened without our active intervention seems doubtful since the Soviet Union tended to lose influence in areas we stayed out of, like China, and to gain it in areas where we intervened, like Southeast Asia.[65]

The point is that if our conviction of a Soviet threat were at all responsive to reality, to borrow a phrase from Kennan, these geopolitical facts might be expected to have some influence. Today, however, the United States seems more preoccupied than ever with the Soviet threat.[66] To judge by the budget and the rhetoric, our officials think the threat has increased, not diminished.[67] To judge by the map, the threat looks about as it must have looked in 1945, before the arrival of the Long

Telegram. The Soviet Union still seems neither very interested in or competent at projecting power and influence beyond its immediate security zone. In this global realm, she appears to accept losses easily and gives no evidence of having a grand design of world domination.

What then accounts for the reproduction of the Soviet threat? This, too, seems to be a feature of the script itself. Hidden within it are three subtle but dynamic principles of self-reproduction. First, there is the Principle of the Cat Chasing its Own Tail. Given the belief that the Soviet Union will do everything within its capability to destroy us -- a belief that has become an uncontested feature of American political rhetoric -- our elected and appointed officials, together with their hired consultants, are more or less obliged to make a variety of moves in our defense. In addition, however, they are also more or less obliged immediately to imagine how any move that has just been made might itself be vulnerable to a Soviet counter-move.[68] Consequently, the more moves we make, the more vulnerable we perceive ourselves to be. Thus the Soviet threat necessarily grows larger regardless of what the Soviet Union actually does.

There are many examples of this Principle, but one will have to suffice here. In 1946 and '47, the United States began to move its air bases closer to the Soviet Union. In the early 1950s,

Albert Wohlstetter at Rand Corp. made the not very surprising discovery that the closer we placed our bases to the Soviet Union, the more vulnerable these bases were to a Soviet surprise attack. Here was one of the first great Soviet threats of the 50s: "SAC was vulnerable".[69] Being an inventive and technologically sophisticated society, a free society, we then went to work to overcome this vulnerability. One idea was to build intercontinental ballistic missiles and attempt to make them invulnerable to attack. Then, of course, it was necessary to worry about the possibility that the Soviet Union might get missiles first. This was the origin of the second great and spurious Soviet threat of the 50s: the "missile gap".[70]

It is possible, incidentally, that Soviet officials realize our vulnerability to feeling vulnerable and have learned how to exploit it. That is, recognizing their own relative military weakness, and feeling safer if we don't see it, they may do the only thing they can do well: they bluff. Thus, though they didn't have militarily effective missiles and wouldn't get them for many years, they did launch "Sputnik" and send Khruschev to the UN to say, "We will bury you." This kept us busy chasing our own tail for many years.

Second, there is the Principle of the Ghost of the Republic. The concept of a "free society" is a necessary part of the script. It is what distinguishes "us" from "them". If we did all

the things to defend ourselves that the script seems to call for, however, we would very quickly cease to be a free society. Consequently, as the political, social and economic costs of following the script mount, an equilibrating reaction occasionally takes over. We try to slow down, create some stability and conserve resources for "the long haul". Eisenhower's "New Look" and doctrine of "Massive Retaliation" was one such period of slowdown after the massive buildup, called for by NSC-68, and the strains of the Korean War.[71] McNamara's doctrine of "Mutual Assured Destruction" and the Kissinger-Nixon program of "detente" and pursuit of arms control marked another slowdown period, following on the heels of the Kennedy missile buildup and the strains of the Vietnam War.[72]

The periods of slowdown, however, incite political entrepreneurs to charge officials in power with not doing everything they can to counteract the Soviet threat.[73] Because the nature and existence of the Soviet threat continues to be taken-for-granted in the slowdown periods, it remains a powerful political resource for anyone who can spot a supposed area of vulnerability, or a potential solution to that vulnerability which is not being pursued.

Thus the threat is resurrected, and periods of slowdown are followed by periods of buildup. For example, the Kennedy program of counter-insurgency was, in part, a response to charges of our

vulnerability in limited wars because of the non-credibility of the threat of Massive Retaliation.[74] Similarly, the Kennedy-McNamara missile buildup was a response to charges that Eisenhower's "New Look" had allowed a "missile gap" to develop. The current Reagan program gained in its impetus in a similar fashion from the Nixon-Kissinger slowdown. It is in this sense that there can be no "stable" strategy. The conception of the Soviet threat, in a "free society", will not allow it.

Finally, there is the Principle of the Liberal's Best Option. Although the script calls for a free society, it does not give the political liberal many options. Compared to their ancestors in the republican script, the liberals in the Cold War script are shrunken figures. Deprived by the witchhunt of political ground to their left, they have seen fit to make major compromises with both corporate and military power. Instead of directly attacking the power and privileges of the corporation, they have settled for welfare programs. Instead of directly attacking the Cold War script, they have tried to limit its excesses and preseve the remnants of a free society.

One consequence of the liberals' limited political options has been their frequent enthusiasm for a broader range of military options as well as arms control. They have supported, for example: the development and deployment of small, tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield as an alternative to massive

strategic bombardment of Russia's cities; the development and deployment of counter-force nuclear weapons as an alternative to counter-value nuclear weapons; counter-insurgency programs as a partial alternative to massive retaliation; development and deployment of sophisticated conventional armaments as an alternative to reliance upon nuclear weapons. Given the political balance of forces at any moment, support for these and other military programs may have represented the best available liberal option. This strategy, however, including support for arms control, contributes significantly to the conviction of the existence of a Soviet threat, even though the motive for the strategy is usually to restrain United States military behavior, not Soviet military behavior.

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This line of reasoning leads to the following mixed conclusion. There is, in principle, one simple way to end the Cold War and the nuclear arms race. The Cold War and the nuclear arms race are not a function of Soviet behavior. They also are not driven by deep and unalterable forces in American society. Rather, they are driven by the scriptural conviction that there is an Enemy "out there" that is trying to destroy us. It is this conviction that produced and sustains the military-industrial

complex, not the other way around. It is this conviction that fuels the arms race by leading us to fund research on every imaginable weapons-system. It is this conviction which leads us to oppose every revolutionary movement in the 3rd World. Take away the conviction and you will take away everything else. Leave the conviction in place, and you will continue to have everything else.

In political practice, of course, it is not easy to call the conviction into question. There seems to be operating in American politics an almost instinctive awareness that, in the absence of the conviction of a Soviet threat, we would find ourselves thrust back in time, facing that very same identity crisis which confronted us in the fall of 1945. Even to get us back to that point would require from many citizens the kind of unusual courage which used to be admired as "republican virtue". Once there, we would still need to write a new script. Perhaps that is why so few are prepared to question in public what many do not fully believe to be the case in their own minds.

###

NOTES

1. This paper is the result of an unusual amount of intellectual collaboration over the past three years. The significance of the American republican tradition and the New Deal for understanding the Cold War period emerged from a course on "Power in American Society", taught jointly by an historian, Steve Hahn, a political scientist, Tracy Strong, and a sociologist, myself. Primarily, however, the ideas presented here were developed in almost constant collaboration over the past year with Jim Skelly. It was he who, as a graduate student, originally urged that we jointly teach a course on "Nuclear Weapons and American Society". It was also he who did the early research on the subject, who insisted on the importance of the social construction of reality, and who brought with him the recognition that nuclear weapons had contributed to the transformation of the Republic. (See his valuable doctoral dissertation, "The Minuteman is a Missile, Not a Soldier: The Death of the Citizen-Soldier," University of California, San Diego, 1984.) I would also like to thank the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation for the grant which allowed us to develop the course on nuclear weapons.

2. The concept of "script" has a dual meaning here: the script provides (1) a representation of reality and (2) a guide to performance.

3. For Aristotle's concept of citizenship, see The Politics, edited and translated by Ernest Barker, (Oxford University Press, New York, 1979), III.i-vi., especially iv.7-15 and vi.9, and also IV.xi.6-8 and VII.ix.7. For the best recent work on the history of republican theory and practice, see J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1975). An important earlier work is Zera S. Fink, The Classical Republicans: an Essay in the Recovery of a Pattern of Thought in Seventeenth Century England, (Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1945).

4. This paragraph draws on Pocock, Chpt. 15; Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1969); Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America, (W.W. Norton & Co., New York, 1980); Richard H. Kohn, Eagle and Sword: The Beginnings of the Military Establishment in America,

The Free Press, New York, 1975); and Russell F. Weigley, Towards an American Army: Military Thought from Washington to Marshall, (Columbia University Press, New York, 1962).

5. In the voluminous secondary literature on the subject, I find that the spirit of a republican dilemma is best captured by Grant McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy, (Vintage Books, New York, 1970). On early premonitions of the danger of corporate power, see McCoy, esp. 253-59. The tenuous moral position of the modern corporation in the Republic is conveyed most sharply, of course, in the language of those who fought the corporation's growing power. Here, for example, is an excerpt from Supreme Court Justice Brandeis' dissenting opinion in Ligget vs. Lee: "The prevalence of the corporation in America has led men of this generation to act, at times, as if the privilege of doing business in corporate form were inherent in the citizen; and has led them to accept the evils attendant upon the free and unrestricted use of the corporate mechanism as if these evils were the inescapable price of civilized life and, hence, to be borne with resignation. Throughout the greater part of our history a different view prevailed. Although the value of this instrumentality in commerce and industry was fully recognized, incorporation for business was commonly denied long after it had been freely granted for religious, educational and charitable purposes. It was denied because of fear. Fear of encroachment upon the liberties and opportunities of the individual. Fear of the subjection of labor to capital. Fear of monopoly. Fear that the absorption of capital by corporations, and their perpetual life, might bring evils similar to those which attended mortmain. There was a sense of some insidious menace inherent in large aggregations of capital, particularly when held by corporations." The quotation may be found in Henry Wallace, Whose Constitution: An Inquiry into the General Welfare, (Reynal & Hitchcock, New York, 1936), 165-66. See also Justice Cardoza's dissenting opinion in the same case. Ibid., 166.

6. The subject is notoriously complex and still awaits comprehensive treatment from the perspective of American republicanism. On the debate in the early Republic over the importance of foreign markets and free trade to the maintenance of republican virtue, and on the relation of this debate to thinking on foreign and military policy, see the suggestive material in McCoy, esp. 76-104, 144-45, 171-178, 197-199, 205-208, 218-223, 237-244. On the fitful efforts in the half-century after the Civil War to make America over into an active world power and the republican dilemmas thus posed, see material in Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy, (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1977), Chpts. 9 and 10, and Towards an American Army, Chpts. 7 and 9; Samuel P. Huntington,

The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, (Harvard Univeristy Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1957), Chpts. 9 and 10; Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansionism, 1860-1898, (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1967), 85-101; and Walter Karp,The Politics of War: the story of two wars which altered forever the political life of the American republic [1890-1920], (Harper Colophon, New York, 1980).

7. The Wilson story is told brilliantly from a republican perspective by Karp, 119-344. The description of the republican dilemma in the next paragraph draws upon the following: Huntington, Chpts. 9-11; Karp, passim; McConnell pps. 60-70; McCoy, passim; William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000, (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1982), Chpt. 9; J. Samuel Walker, Henry A. Wallace and American Foreign Policy, (Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn., 1976), Chpts. 1-4, esp. 41-42; Weigley,The American Way of War, Chpt. 11.

8. See, for example, Wallace, Whose Constitution, esp. Chpt. 12 and New Frontiers, (Reynal & Hitchcock, New York, 1934), esp. Chpts. 4-12; Rexford G. Tugwell, The Battle for Democracy, (Columbia U. Press, New York, 1935). Ellis W. Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of Monpopoly, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1969), 11-12. See Justice Cardozza's comment, cited in note #5 above: "There is a widespread belief that the existing unemployment is the result, in large part, of the gross inequality in the distribution of wealth and income which giant corporations have fostered; that by the control which the few have exerted through giant corporations, individual initiative and effort are being paralyzed, creative power impaired and human happiness lessened..."

9. This analysis and these policy goals can be found in the writings of what I would term "the republican left wing" of the New Deal, including especially Wallace and Tugwell and the economic planners in and out of office who wre closely associated with them. On the need for restoring a republican balance against corporate power by means of democratic economic planning, see Wallace, Whose Constitution and New Frontiers and Tugwell, The Battle for Democracy and "The Principle of Planning and the Institution of Laissaz-Faire," American Economic Review, 22 (March 1932), supplement. For secondary works on this version of New Deal planning and the resistances and fears it aroused, see especially the excellent work by Hawley, cited above, and also Otis L. Graham, Toward a Planned Society: From Roosevelt to Nixon, (Oxford University Press, New York, 1976), Chpt. 1, and Marion Clawson, New Deal Planning: The National Resources Planning Board, (The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore,

1981). It is important to note that this kind of thinking continued in official circles throughout the 1930's and into the war period, found an important new resource after the publication of Keynes' work in 1936, and would have had a vigorous proponent in the White House after the war if Wallace had won the vice-presidential nomination in 1944. On the influence of Keynes on New Deal planners and the business response, see Robert Collins, The Business Response to Keynes, 1929-1964, (Columbia University Press, New York, 1981).

10. A comprehensive account of the widespread and diverse sources of resistance to the New Deal has yet to be written. The rhetoric of patriotic republicanism and anti-communism which united these otherwise divergent interests became a crucial factor, of course, in the politics of the early Cold War (see below). For rich and suggestive material on the use of anti-communist rhetoric to defend pre-New Deal positions of power, privilege and influence, see Hawley, 143, 151-158 (see references in note #3, p. 152), 165, 395-398; Ronald A. Mulder, The Insurgent Progressives in the United States Senate and the New Deal, 1933-1939, (Garland Publishing, Inc., New York, 1979), esp. Chpts. 5-8; James T. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal: The Growth of the Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1933-1939, (University of Kentucky Press, Lexington, Ky., 1967), esp. p. 195; and Alan Brinkley, Voices of Protest: Huey Long, Father Coughlin, and the Great Depression, (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1982). Also: Harvey L. Levenstein, Communism, Anticommunism and the CIO, (Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn., 1981), esp. Chpts. 4 and 5; James Boylan, The New Deal Coalition and the Election of 1946, (Garland Publishing, Inc., New York, 1981), esp. 135ff.; James A. Gross, The Making of the National Labor Relations Board, Volume 2, The Reshaping of the National Labor Relations Board: National Labor Policy in Transition, 1937-1947, (State University of New York Press, Albany, 1981).

11. On the increasingly strident language and unfinished agenda of the New Deal's leftwing, see Hawley, Part IV; Walker, Chpts. 7 and 8; Alonzo L. Hamby, Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism, (Columbia University Press, New York, 1973), Chpt. 1; and Norman D. Markowitz, The Rise and Fall of the People's Century: Henry A. Wallace and American Liberalism, 1941-1948, (The Free Press, New York, 1973), Chpt. 1 and 2. Characterisitc of these concerns was Thurman Arnold's fear that the partial reforms of the New Deal had produced a Broker State, the policies of which would further undermine the republican character of the polity. In a 1944 article, "The Coming Economic Conflict," Arnold, who had been director of the antitrust division of the Justice Department, warned that stringent public regulation and renewed antimonopoly activity would be needed to protect the consumer from "irreconcilable pressure groups, each

seeking a larger share of the diminishing national income, each destroying purchasing power in order to maintain artificial prices for itself while the increasing number of the unorganized and insecure compel the government to provide subsidies out of the same diminishing national income.". Quoted in Markowitz, p. 58.

12. See Markowitz, Chpt. 2; Walker, Chpts. 7 and 8; and Richard J. Walton, Henry Wallace, Harry Truman, and the Cold War, (the Viking Press, New York, 1973), Chpt. 1.

13. "The Price of Free World Victory", later known as "The Century of Common Man", was first delivered as a speech to the Free World Association in New York City on May 8, 1942, six months after the United States entered the war. PM, a leftwing New York newspaper, published it twice. It appeared as an ad in The Washington Post and Women's Wear Daily. Issued next as a pamphlet, it sold 20,000 copies in a few weeks. Federal agencies then distributed hundreds of thousands of copies. The speech was widely interpreted at the time as a New Deal answer to Henry Luce's "The American Century" (see below), but more recent interpreters have tended to discount the differences between the global visions of Wallace and Luce. I regard this tendency as a mistake and as symptomatic of the change in the character of American republicanism which occurred with the coming of the Cold War script. (For a critical comment with a slightly different emphasis from mine, see Markowitz, 53-54, and his references.) The Wallace speech has been reprinted in Peter G. Filene, ed., American Views of Soviet Russia, 1917-1965, (The Dorsey Press, Homewood, Ill., 1968), pps. 190-196. It is best read in the context of his other wartime and post-war speeches. For example, "We shall decide some time in 1943 or 1944 whether to plant the seeds of World War No. III. That war will be probable if we fail to demonstrate that we can furnish full employment after this war comes to an end and fascist interests motivated largely by anti-Russian bias get control of our government. Unless the Western democracies and Russia come to a satisfactory understanding before the war ends, I very much fear that World War No. III will be inevitable..."(Quoted in Walton, p. 15.)

14. See Mulder, 302-304, and also Wayne S. Cole, Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932-45, (University of Nebraska Press, 1983).

15. Life, X (February 17, 1941), 61-63.

16. See Cole, op. cit., and the review by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Desperate Times", New York Review of Books, Nov. 24, 1983, p. 37. Four months before Pearl Harbor, the House passed the draft-extension bill by a single vote and 64 Democrats votes against the President. In November, more members of Congress

voted against neutrality revision than had voted agaianst Lend-Lease in March. Schlesinger claims the isolationist-interventionist debate was one of the angriest ever. See also the reference to Mulder in note #14 above.

17. Huntington, 330-331. On the shift in the view of the Joint Chiefs during the war, see 331-335.

18. See notes #16 and #17. In characterizing the United States' general lack of clarity with respect to its role as a world power, Huntington writes of "a failure to appreciate what its long range political goals properly were by a nation immature in the ways of international politics" (p. 327). In The American Way of War, Wiegely offers an equally revealing judgment, which links this "immaturity" to republican traditions and points to the break with these traditions which occurred in the Cold War. "...during 1941-45 and throughout American history until that time, the United States usually possessed no national strategy for the employment of force or the threat of force to attain political ends, except as the nation used force in wartime openly and directly in pursuit of military victories as complete as was desired or possible...The United States was not involved in international politics continuously enough or with enough consistency of purpose to permit the development of a coherent national strategy for the consistent pursuit of political goals by diplomacy in combination with armed force. A not unhealthy corrolary of this situation was its contribution to civilian predominance over the military in the American government; when the military themselves regarded strategy as narrowly military in content, their temptations to intervene in the making of national policy were proportionately small...During the Cold War and especially the Korean War, the belief that the United States was involved in a protracted conflict with international Communism led to a departure from historic habits and to an effort to form a national strategy for the employment of American power in defense and promotion of the country's political values and interests"(p. xix).

19. The emphasis here is on calculations, that is, expectations, hopes, plans, and not necessarily effective policies that could be immediately implemented. This paragraph and the next are based on material from Martin Sherwin, A World Destroyed: the Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance, (New york, 1973); Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb and the Cold War, 1945-1950, (New York, 1980); Michael Sherry, Preparing for the Next War: American Plans for Postwar Defense, 1941-1945, (New Haven, 1977); Perry McCoy Smith, The Air Force Plans for Peace, 1943-1945, (Baltimore, 1970); Robert L. Messer, The End of an Alliance: James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman, and the Origins of the Cold War, (Chapel hill, N.C., 1982); Barton J. Bernstein,

"American Foreign Policy and the Origins of the Cold War," in Barton J. Bernstein, ed., Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration, (Chicago, 1970), 15-77, and "Roosevelt, Truman, and the Atomic Bomb, 1941-1945: A Reinterpretation," Political Science Quarterly, 90:1 (Spring 1975): 23-69; David Alan Rosenberg, "American Atomic Strategy and the Hydrogen Bomb Decision," Journal of American History, 66 (1979-80): 62-87; and Melvyn P. Leffler, "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-48," American Historical Review, 89:2 (April 1984): 346-381.

20. These strategic plans to overcome the perceived deficiencies of the pre-war military establishment were being developed during the war, before the relevant planners knew of the existence of the bomb. After its testing and use, and after assessments of its effectiveness, military planning came increasingly to rely upon the bomb as the means of realizing the new and still evolving conception of national security. See Sherry, esp. Chpt. 7, Smith, Rosenberg and Leffler.

21. The problems were technical, political and diplomatic. They involved inter-service rivalry, a diminished military budget, uncertainty over the effectiveness and capabilities of the bomb, a virtually non-existent stockpile of weapons, a dispersal of bomb-assembly teams, difficulties with nuclear reactors, moral qualms and concern with public opinion, and most important, a widespread (but not universal) desire in military and civilian circles not to jeopardize the possibility of post-war agreements with the Soviet Union. On the failure of Byrnes' efforts to use the bomb as a diplomatic resource with the Russians, see Messer and also Bernstein, "Roosevelt, Truman, and the Atomic Bomb," op. cit., 62-69. On inter-service rivalry, technical difficulties, and strategic doubts about reliance upon nuclear weapons, see Sherry, Chpts. 4 and 7, esp. 205-232 and Rosenberg. On concern over agreements with the Soviet Union, see below and Leffler, esp. 352, 357, and Sherry, Chpt. 7.

22. Much of the dispute, rivalry and doubt was reflected in Cabinet-level discussions and memorandums sent to Truman by high-ranking officials. The following two paragraphs are based primarily on concerns expressed in this manner. See, for example, Secretary of War Henry Stimson's two memorandums to Truman on September 12, 1945, as reprinted in Barton J. Bernstein and Allen J. Matusow, eds.,The Truman Administration: A Documentary History, (Harper & Row, New York, 1968), 220 ff.. (Excerpts also appear in Walton, op. cit., 53-54.) Stimson's position was then discussed at the Cabinet meeting on September 21. See Wallace's report of the meeting in John Morton Blum, ed., The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A. Wallace, 1942-1946, (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1973), 482-484 and 485-487. From the

Diary, see also pps. 471, 474, 476, 481, 489-494, 496-504, 505-511, 515-517. 545-553. Also of relevance are Barton J. Bernstein, "Roosevelt, Truman, and the Atomic Bomb," op. cit., esp. 59-62, 65, 67, and Robert Karl Manoff, "Covering the Bomb: The Nuclear Story and the News," Working Papers, May-June, 1983.

23. Note Stimson's prescient comment: "To put the matter concisely, I consider the problem of our satisfactory relations with Russia as not merely connected with but as virtually dominated by the problem of the atomic bomb. Except for the problem of the control of that bomb, those relations, while vitally important, might not be immediately pressing. The establishment of relations of mutual confidence between her and us could afford to await the slow progress of time. But with the discovery of the bomb, they become immediately emergent. Those relations may be perhaps irretrievably embittered by the way in which we approach the solution of the bomb with Russia..." (Quoted in Walton, op. cit., 54.) Stimson was evidently not alone in this view. According to Wallace, Stimson's position on sharing scientific information on atomic energy with the Soviet Union directly, not through or with third parties such as would be involved in the United Nations, was supported by nine others present at the Cabinet meeting and opposed by four with one individual giving an indefinite response (see the citation to Wallace in note #22). For a fuller discussion of Stimson's proposal and account of the Cabinet meeting discussion, see Barton J. Bernstein, "The Quest for Security: American Foreign Policy and International Control of Atomic Energy, 1942-1946," JAH, 60 (1973-74): 1016-1019. Bernstein, basing his account on Secretary of the Navy Forrestal's diary, gives a different assessment of the strength of the opposition, finding six individuals in agreement with Stimson, seven opposed and one favoring delay. Within the War Department, the response to Stimson's proposal was not favorable. See Sherry, op. cit., 212-13.

24. See Sherry and Rosenberg on the difficulties that this situation was creating for military planners.

25. The significance of the strikes extends well beyond their number (4,630 work stoppages involving 4.9 million workers in the year after V-J Day). At issue was the nature and scope of collective bargaining and, in particular, its potential expansion into areas which had formerly been the exclusive prerogative of management. See especially David Brody, Workers in Industrial America: Essays on the 20th Century Struggle, (Oxford University Press, New York, 1980), Chpt. 5. CIO progressive/were advocating "a national planning effort" that would make organized labor "a coequal with management, with the government acting as the arbiter between these two relatively independent groups in a free

society." (Brody, 175-182; the quote is from Clinton S. Golden and Harold J. Ruttenberg, The Dynamics of Industrial Democracy, (New York, 1942), 330.) The aim, in other words, was the restoration of that "republican balance" which had also been the aim of the New Deal's left wing in the thirties (see above, p. 8). The author is at work on a more extended treatment of this subject. Also on the strikes, and the anti-labor reaction which they provoked not only in business circles but also in rural and small-town America, see Boylan, op. cit., Chpt. 3 and p. 50, notes 10-13. On concerns over a renewed depression after the war, see Collins, op. cit., and material in George Lipsitz, Class and Culture in Cold War America, (J.F. Bergin, South Hadley, Mass, 1982), 120-121.

26. In the author's judgment, the great importance of this strike was that, in bargaining for a say in pricing decisions, Reuther was attempting to shape the union movement in the direction of "republican virtue", that is, with a regard for the "common good" and not just the "special interests" of the union. On this and GM's precedent-setting negative response, see Brody, 183ff. On the Truman Administration's response to the strike, see Boylan, 37-39.

27. See Collins, op. cit., for the most recent account of the history of the Full Empoloyment Bill, including the role of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in writing the more conservative House version which eventually became law. Also Stephen Kemp Bailey, Congress Makes a Law (New York, 1964. Truman withdwrew Administration support for the original version in the midst of floor debate.

28. On the loyalty issue and the intensification of the domestic anti-communist theme at the end of the war, see: Alan D. Harper, The Politics of Loyalty: The White House and the Communist Issue, 1946-1952, (Greenwood Publishing, Westport, Conn., 1969), Chpt. 3; Lawrence S. Wittner, Cold War America: From hiroshima to Watergate, (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1973), Chpt. 4; Boylan, 35, 41, 44-45, 135ff.; Levenstein, Chpt. 12; and Earl Latham,The Communist Controversy in Washington: From the New Deal to McCarthy, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1966). Of course, New Deal reforms in the thirties had relied upon the organizational talents and energies of communists. On the activity of communists in government and labor unions in the thirties and during the war, see: Latham, , Chpts. 3-7; and Levenstein, Chpts. 1-2 and 6-9; Boylan, 75-77. On anti-communist investigations by Congressional committees and executive agencies during this same period, with some indication of the anti-New Deal motives of the investigators, see Robert K. Carr, The House Committee on Un-American Activities, 1945-1950, (Cornell University Press,

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Ithaca, N.Y., 1952), Chpt. 1; Levenstein, Chpts. 4-5; Latham, 28-38, 363-65, 381-86, and passim; and references in note #10 above.

29. See material from the operations of the Loyalty Review Board in Harper; for example, p. 50, where "favoring peace and civil liberties" was taken as evidence by an informer that a government employee was advocating the Communist Party line.

30. Reprinted in Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gadsdis, eds., Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950, (Columbia Unbiversity Press, New York, 1978), pps. 50-63. Kennan's cable was classfied until 1971. Perhaps for that reason, most accounts of the origins of the Cold War bypass the telegram and focus instead on Kennan's Mr. "X" article in Foreign Affairs ("The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Vol. 25 (July 1947), pps. 566-582), which appeared too late to influence the decisive shift in American policymaking with which I am concerned. An important exception to this neglect of the telegram, and one to which I am much indebted, is Daniel Yergin's Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State, (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1977).

It is clear from Yergin that the views expressed by Kennan in the telegram were actually formulated years before and had their roots in what Yergin calls "the Riga axioms" (see Chpt. 1; also see Lloyd C. Gardner, Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941-49, (Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1970), Chpt. 10, esp. 279-80, 288-90). This is important becuase it tends to confirm what is also suggested by the rhetorical strategy of the telegram: namely, Kennan was not basing his judgments on an examination of Soviet behavior in the context of events during and after the war. Rather, he assumed that Soviet behavior was predetermined and not responsive in its overall design to the actions of other nations. This was the fundamental tenent of the "Riga axioms" as they developed after the Bolshevik Revolution and served as the basis for the American policy of non-recognition of the new regime. For example: "Their aim is world-wide revolution...Their doctrines aim at the destruction of all governments as now constituted" (quote from DeWitt Clinton Poole, who worked on Russian affairs in the State Dept. in 1919; in Yergin, p. 19). For Kennan and others sharing this outlook, Soviet behavior would remain fixed and frozen in this mold for as long as the regime existed.

Long dominant and uncontested in U.S. policy-making circles, the "Riga axioms" and those who professed them were partially s unted aside in the 1930s and 40s: after diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union, and as a consequence of the new factors and personalities which entered into American policymaking with the

New Deal and World War II (see Yergin, Chpt. 2). For a variety of reasons which I have been attempting to outline, Kennan's telegram came at just the right moment to serve as a crucial resource for the reassertion of the "Riga axioms". The immediate occasion prompting the telegram was a speech by Stalin on February 9, 1946, which caused alarm in the West. Kennan was asked by officials in the State Department to provide an explanation. See Yergin's interpretation of the speech, pp. 166-67.

For a pertinent sketch of Kennan's character and the formation of his early views on Russia, see Yergin, Chpt. 1, esp. pps. 21, 27-28. An official fitness report on Kennan in 1933 listed these qualities: "excellent mind, supple and penetrating, and well balanced, save perhaps for a tendency...to entertain intellectual concepts rather emotionally, and to be a trifle more enthusiatically idealistic or more hopelessly cynical, than would be the case if he were a little more mature."

31. For example: "The problem of Russian capabilities and intentions is so complex, and the unknowns are so numerous, that it is impossible to grasp the situation and describe it in a set of coherent and well-established conclusions" -- Geroid T. robinson, Chief, Research and Intelligence, State Department, December 10, 1945, cited in Yergin, p. 138. For the general ambivalence, confusion and contradictions in American policy and pronouncements with respect to Russia in the period from September through December 1945, see Yergin, Chpts. 5 and 6. For the uncertainty surrounding analysis of Russian intentions and capabilities in this period, see Leffler, op. cit., 357, 359-362, 365 and note #53, and Yergin, p. 165-66. See also this text below, p. 27ff..

32. There are two important examples of what I am driving at here. First, at the London Foreign Ministers Conference in September, the Russians made a bid for recognition of their supremacy of influence (and/or control) in the Balkans, especially with respect to Romania and Bulgaria. The U.S. delegation's Eastern European specialists strenuously urged Sec. Byrnes to resist this Soviet "trap", but this put Byrnes in the awkward position of denying to Russia on its borders the kind of influence (and/or control) that the U.S. seemed at that moment to be claiming over Japan and islands in the Pacific and that Russia had conceded to the United States and Great Britain over Italy and to the latter over Greece. Byrnes appears to have been aware of the apparent contradiction. (On this, see Yergin, 131-32. For U.S. policymakers' attitude about American supremacy in the Western Hemisphere at the time, see Leffler, 354.) Second, Stalin's speech of February 9, 1946 -- the one that indirectly led to the Long Telegram (see above, note #30) -- was interpreted

by some as a reversion to Stalin's 1928 policy of isolation as well as representing a commitment to remilitarization. However, to someone like Wallace, who was inclined to interpret Soviet behavior in the context of recent American behavior and as a response to that behavior, Stalin's speech assumed a different significance. "I told him [William Bullitt, former Ambassador to Russia] that I thought this [speech] was accounted for in some measure by the fact that it was obvious to Stalin that our military was getting ready for war with Russia; that they were setting up bases all the way from Greenland, Iceland, northern Canada, and alaska to Okinawa, with Russia in mind. I said that Stalin obviously knew what these bases meant and also knew the attitude of many of our people through our press. we were challenging him and his speech was taking up the challenge." (See Wallace's diary, p. 547 and also 549-50.) These were the kinds of contextual interpretation of Soviet behavior that Kennan was attempting to circumvent and make irrelevant in his Telegram.

33. See Rosenberg, op. cit., 64; Leffler, 350-354, and Sherry, 204.

34. See note #30 above. Frustrated at the direction of U.S. policy and the lack of attention to his views, Kennan mentioned to colleagues in January that he was considering resigning soon from the Foreign Service. See C. Ben Wright, "Mr. 'X' and Containment," Slavic Review 35 (March 1976): 12. This article is cited by Yergin, p. 443, note #14.

35. The enthusiastic response to the Telegram, including the news leak, is described by Yergin, 170-71.

36. For the confused state of public opinion on the issue of Soviet-American relations, and the way officials were eventually able to "clarify" the situation once they had arrived at consensus themselves, see the interesting material in Yergin, 171ff.

37. The following analysis relies heavily upon material contained in the important article by Leffler (cited above, note #19), whose research is based on massive numbers of recently declassified documents (see p. 347, note 5). The documents, as reported by Leffler, indicate a significant shift in policy-making in the spring and summer after the arrival of the telegram. Leffler, however, does not attribute this shift to the telegram. Instead, he explains the shift in terms of growing concern over "economic and political conditions throughout Europe and Asia" and the opportunity which these conditions created for "communists [to] take power, even without direct Russian intervention..." (p. 363, 365). The problems with this explanation cannot be dealt with here, but it is worth noting

that the Telegram itself, by emphasizing Soviet subversive methods of expansion, served to focus and justify attention on political and economic conditions in Europe and Asia.

38. For example: in the summer of 1945, Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy finally overruled the senior member of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee who had advised not to build an airbase in Iceland because it would freighten the Russians. McCloy charged that the official, General S.D. Embrick, had "a rather restricted concept of what is necessary for national defense." (Leffler, 352.)

39. Leffler, 357. The first decision was made in April, the second in June 1945. For evidence that civilian officials were influenced by similar concerns, see Yergin, 100-105, 109-110, 114, 117-119, 129, and Chpt. 6.

40. Leffler, 359. In October 1945, the Joint Intelligence Staff predicted that the Soviet Union would seek to avoid war for five to ten years. Despite confrontation over the Soviet troops remaining in Iran in April 1946 and the concern over a communist uprising in France in May, military intelligence continued throughout '46 to believe that the Soviet Union did not want war, was not preparing for war and would avoid any steps, such as supporting a coup, which might bring on a war.

41. Ibid., 359. The CIA added that the Soviets would prefer to gain hegemony by political and economic means.

42. The Bohlen quotation is from Yergin, 165.

43. Leffler, 365. I should empahsize that there were also many officials, high and low, who didn't believe in the possibility of working out agreements with the Soviets and were convinced they wanted world domination. I merely insist that opinion was divided and confused, and policy-making was therefore inhibited.

44. See Leffler's "Reply", AHR, 89:2 (April 1984), p. 396.

45. Leffler, 365.

46. Ibid., 361. For assessments of Soviet economic weakness, see p. 362. In his comments on Leffler's article, John Lewis Gaddis raised the following objection: "Leffler fails to distinguish clearly enough, in my view, between the Russian military threat to North America, which he correctly says no one took very seriously at the time, and the possibility that the Red Army might overrun Western Europe...Although intelligence reports discounted the probability of a deliberate attack in Europe, they by no means disregarded the possibility of hostilities beginning

as the result of accident or misperception. And, given Soviet conventional force superiority at that time, the Russians would have had the capability to overrun most of Western Europe in a matter of weeks, a fact all American war plans during this period took for granted." (See "Comments", AHR, 89:2 (April 1984), p. 384.) With respect to Eurasia, however, Leffler had noted that: "Despite Soviet superiority in manpower, General Eisenhower and Admiral Forest E. Sherman doubted that Russia could mount a surprise attack, and General Lincoln, Admiral Cato Glover, and Secretaries Patterson and Forrestal believed that Soviet forces would encounter acute logistical problems in trying to overrun Eurasia - especially in the Near East, Spain, and Italy (p. 361). See also "Reply", pps. 396-97, where it is noted that because of the initiatives the United States was taking to rebuild Western Europe in 1948, there was an increased likelihood of war. However: "When American officials talked about war arising out of a miscalculation...they meant that they might underestimate the Soviet perception of threat engendered by American actions or that the Soviets might underestimate the West's determination to carry out its goals even if it meant war." (See also 373-374.)In other words, it was the outlook and actions of American policymakers after the Long Telegram that altered the calculations of the likelihood of war.

47. Historians have frequently noted that U.S. policymakers' attitudes towards the Soviet Union "crystallized" and "hardened" in early 1946. See, for example, John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, (New York, 1972); Yergin, 192, 217, 219-220, Chpts. 9 and 10; Hamby, op. cit., 118. For the most detailed documentation of this shift, however, see Leffler, 366-69 and passim.

48. Leffler, 366.

49. Ibid., 369.

50. On decline of studies of Soviet intentions, Ibid., 368, note 59. On withdrawal of the most thoughtful earlier studies, 367, note 56. On the deletion of information concerning Soviet weakness, 369. On pressure on Byrnes, 370; see also Yergin, 183-186. On influence of military in drafting Baruch Plan, 371; see also Barton J. Bernstein, "Quest for Security," 1033-44; and Herken, op. cit..

51. The full memorandum is in the Harry S. Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missotri. The conclusion of the memorandum, from which I am quoting below, is reprinted in Etzold and Gaddis, 64-71. The memorandum was presented to Truman on September 24. Given Kennan's frequent claim that his views as expressed in the Long Telegram and Mr. "X" article were

misinterpreted, especially with respect to the militarization and universalization of containment, it is worth noting his comments on the Clifford Memorandum. In response to questions from George Elsey on September 13 -- "Have we omitted any impt. element of the Report? Was tone of report o.k.? miscellaneous suggestions?" -- Kennan replied in writing, "I think the general tone is excellent and I have no fault to find with it." He offered no substantive criticism in the six-page reply. (I am grateful to Bart Bernstein for calling this correspondence to my attention and sending a copy of it. The original is in the George Elsey Files, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Harry S. Truman Library, Feb. 13, Feb. 16.)

52. Quoted in Yergin, p. 244. The questionnaire was sent to the Secretaries of State, War, Navy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, and other Administration officials. The background to the preparation of the memorandum is discussed in Yergin, 234, 241-242. The individual responses from the State and War Departments are also discussed (242-44). These indicate quite clearly how the interpretive framework of the Long Telegram was being used to justify a variety of institutional ambitions and a new conception of American national security. For the State Department, according to Yergin, the local dimensions of any question were secondary to the grand scheme of incipient East-West conflict. The Department's policy guide said, "We must conduct a global policy and not expect to advance our interests by treating each question on its apparent merits as it arises." According to Chester Nimitz, chief of Naval Operations, Soviet naval activity - actual or potential, whether it were in the Arctic or Pacific oceans, in the Baltic, Black, or Mediterranean seas - threatened U.S. security. The Russians, he said, were preparing for such ventures as attempting "to neutralize" Britain by blockade, bombardment and invasion, and were aiming to launch submarine raids against American coastal cities. As a response, the Navy recommended the development of major U.S. naval presences in the Atlantic and Mediterranean. The War Department insisted that the Russians fully expected and even wanted a war, and held the Soviet Union responsible for most of the world's troubles. The United States needed to be ready for imminent Russian "use of armed forces on a global scale. Security preparations in light of this estimate must be both political and military."

53. These examples are taken from Yergin, 191, 212-13, 226, 243-44; and Leffler, 367-68.

54. Leffler, 367-68, 394-96.

55 Ibid., 368.

56. Yergin, 279-82, 288-89, 295.

57. Ibid., 243-44, and Leffler, 368-69.

58. An interesting account of Truman's dismissal of Wallace can be found in Yergin, 245-55. Wallace's speech is reprinted in Filene, op. cit., 167-173. It should be noted that the speech was on September 12, twelve days before the Clifford memo was presented to Truman, but not before the consensus reflected in the memo had been achieved. In the speech, Wallace attempted to maintain a balanced position. For example: "Russia must be convinced that we are not planning for war against her, and we must be certain that Russia is not carrying on territorial expansion or world domination through native Communists faithfully following every twist and turn in the Moscow party line." Or: "...we should recognize that we have no more business in the political affairs of Eastern Europe than Russia has in the political affairs of Latin America, Western Europe and the United States...[W]hether we like it or not, the Russians will try to socialize their sphere of influence just as we try to democratize our sphere of influence." Or: "...we must insist on an open door for trade throughout the world. There will always be ideological conflict - but that is no reason why diplomats cannot work out a basis for both systems to live safely in the world side by side." Nevertheless, from within the policymaking consensus, the speech was now heard as appeasement.

59. An example of the ambiguity from which citizens needed to be rescued is contained in a letter which John Foster Dulles received in September 1946 from members of the Committee on Foreign Relations in Detroit, an affiliate of the Council on Foreign Relations. They were inviting Dulles to help clarify the situation because "frankly we are pretty much at sea. Two or three times after rather extended discussions with well-informed discussion leaders we have come to the conclusion that the United States and Russia can 'get along' and live in the same world, enjoying a reasonable amount of peace and harmony. We concluded also that Russia only wants to secure her borders, is internally unprepared for another war, and consequently doesn't want one, and has no intention of grabbing new territory, or trying to evangelize the world toward communism. These are things our committee has believed but we are becoming disillusioned and would like to have someone who knows the answers to help us straighten our thinking." (Quoted in Yergin, 172.)

60. The Wilson quote may be found in Brody, 181. The Chamber of Commerce campaign is described in I.F. Stone, The Truman Era, (Monthly Review Press, New York, 1953), 80-86. Suggestive material on the politics of Sourthern racism in this period --

exacerbated by a 1944 Supreme Court decision outlawing white primaries -- is in Boylan, 85-88. On the Republicans' use of anti-communism in Congress after the 1946 elections, see Athan Theoharis, Seeds of Repression: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of McCarthyism, (Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1971) and "The Escalation of the Loyalty Program," in Barton J. Bernstein, ed., Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration, (Chicago, 1970).

61. By the spring of 1947, for example, Kennan was expressing concern that the public reaction had gone too far in the direction of a "hysterical sort of anti-communism," which he said he "deplored." See Yergin, 284. On the relatively contained character of domestic anticommunism before 1946, see the judgment of Theoharis, Seeds of Repression, 7-8. On the attitude of Communist Party members as to the compatibility between republicanism and communism during the New Deal, see Latham, 61: "The Almond study tends to show that the exoteric members (not the hard core of the insiders) joined [the Party] not because it was revolutionary, nor even in the main because it was socialist, but because it seemed more stenuously reformist than the existing parties." The Almond reference is to Gabriel Almond, The Appeals of Communism, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1954).

62. That is, Wallace's fear that the triumph of an anti-Soviet foreign policy would go hand-in-hand with the defeat of New Deal domestic aspirations. See above, p. 10-11, where the point is stated with a slightly different emphasis.

63. See Etzold and Gaddis, p. 392. NSC-68 was classified until 1975. Officially titled as "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," it has been described as "the most elaborate effort made by United States officials during the early Cold War years to integrate political, economic, and military considerations into a comprehensive statement of national security policy." (Etzold and Gaddis, p. 383.) Authored by a small, special State and Defense Department study group headed by Paul Nitze (who in January 1950 had replaced Kennan as head of the Policy Planning Staff at the State Dept.), NSC-68 was an attempt to overcome the anti-inflation budget constraints imposed by Truman and achieve the kind of extensive military buildup called for in the Clifford Memorandum. The outbreak of the Korean War became the occasion for achieving these objectives. For useful discussions of NSC-68, see Paul Y. Hammond, "NSC-68: Prologue to Rearmament," in Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. hammond, and Glen H. Snyder, Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets, (Columbia University Press, New York, 1962), and Jerry W. Saunders, Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present danger and the Politics of Containment, (South End Press, Boston, 1983), Chpt. 1. See also Leffler, 373-378, on the now perceived need for

greater military capabilities given the extensive commitments we were making.

64. This material is taken from The Defense Monitor, Vol. IX, no. 1 (1982). See the extensive discussion as well as the explanation of "influence" and its measurement. The twelve countries in which the Soviet Union was judged to have "significant" influence in 1982 were: Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslavakia, Ethiopia, East Germany, Hungary, Laos, Libya, Mongolia, Mozambique, Poland, Romania, Syria, Yemen (Aden), and Vietnam. The sixteen countries in which the Soviet Union was judged to have had significant influence in the past were: Albania, Algeria, Bangladesh, China, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, North Korea, Mali, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen (Sana), and Yugoslavia. From 1945 to 1980, the number of countries in the world more than doubled (from about 74 to 155). Almost all the new countries were former colonies of Western powers. On the basis of the Kennan-Clifford script, one might have expected far greater Soviet success.

65. The difficult case, of course, is Western Europe. What would have happened there without U.S. intervention? I do not know, but two points are relevant to the present argument. (1) The Soviet Union was not judged at the time to pose a military threat to Western Europe (see Leffler). Nor was the Soviet Union judged to be encouraging or supporting indigenous communist uprisings or armed takeovers in countries considered to be within the Western sphere of influence such as France or Greece (see Leffler and Yergin). (2) Without U.S. intervention, it seems likely that communist and socialist parties would have acquired greater influence, and the tone and substance of politics might well have shifted leftward. However, given the difficulty that the Soviet Union has had in getting its way even in impoverished African countries which it has assisted, it seems unlikely that any Western European country would have capitulated to Soviet control or extensive influence. In this sense, I agree with Leffler (see note #37 above). The newly evolved conception of American national security, including the perceived need to keep any kind of significant communist influence out of Western Europe, was a far more decisive factor in U.S. intervention than Soviet behavior itself. Moreover, once the United States committed itself to this conception of national security, the Soviet threat was bound to grow greater. For example: "In July 1947, intelligence analysts in the War Department maintained that the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan had resulted in a more aggressive Soviet attitude toward the United States and had intensified tensions. 'These tensions have caused a sharper line of demaracation between West and East tending to magnify the significance of conflicting points of view, and reducing the possibility of agreement on any point.' Intelligence officers

understood that the Soviets would perceive American efforts to build strategic highways, construct airfields, and transfer fighter bombers to Turkey as a threat to Soviet security and to the oilfields in the Caucuses...Intelligence analysts also recognized that the Soviets would view the Marshall Plan as a threat to Soviet control in Eastern Europe as well as a death-knell to communist attempts to capture power peacefully in Western Europe....'The whole Berlin crisis,' army planners informed Eisenhower, 'has arisen as a result of ...actions on the part of the Western powers'" (Leffler, 373; see also 374).

66. For examples, see the articles in W. Scott Thompson, ed., From Weakness to Strength: National Security in the 1980s, (Institute for Contemporary Studies, San Francisco, 1980).

67. See the address of Jean Kirkpatrick to the Republican National Convention, August 20, 1984, reprinted in the next day's NY Times.

68. This is a function, in part, of what is known as "worst case analysis". For how this works in practice, see Herbert F. York, "A Personal View of the Arms Race," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 26 (March 1970): 27-31.

69. On the decision to move bases closer to the Soviet Union, see Leffler, 372. On Wohlstetter, see Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1983), 90-94, 97-110, 117-124, and Chpt. 8.

70. See Kaplan, Chpts. 9 and 10.

71. On the "New Look" and "Massive Retaliation", see Richard A. Aliano, American Defense Policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy: The Politics of Changing Military requirements, 1957-1961, (Ohio University Press, Athens, Ohio, 1975), esp. Chpt. 2.

72. On the McNamara slowdown ~~and~~ AFTER the McNamara buildup, see Kaplan, esp. Chpts. 22-23; for Kissenger-Nixon and "detente", see Sanders, 137-145 and Chpt. 5, and John Lewis Gaddis, "The Rise, Fall and Future of Detente," Foreign Affairs (Winter 1983/84), 354-377.

73. See Aliano, passim; Kaplan, passim; Sanders, passim;and Desmond Ball, Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile Program of the Kennedy Administration, (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1980)

74. The classic statement of the charge is Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet, (Harper, New York, 1959). See also Aliano, 107ff., and Kaplan, 196ff. and 328ff.)

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